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ARTICLES 

HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH SPECIES: CAN 

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 

SAVE THE NORTH 

ATLANTIC SWORDFISH? 

KAREN L. SMITH* 
INTRODUCTION 
The oceans cover approximately 71 % of the earth's surface.1 
This vast area provides the human race with transport, recreation, 
minerals, fuels, and a source of food.2 However, as the population 
of the earth explodes,3 it becomes more difficult for the ocean to 
continue providing us with these resources. In fact, many of the 
resources which are most valuable to humans may be exhausted if 
they are not regulated carefully. Ocean fisheries4 are an important 
example of such a resource. 
Fisheries provide the population of the world with a much 
needed source of food. In many countries, fish serve as the primary 
source of protein in the populations' diet, and are thus necessary for 
vital sustenance. Concern about the future of fisheries has in­
* Candidate for Masters of Law in International Environmental Law, George 
Washington University Law School; J.D., 1998, Western New England College School 
of Law; B.S. with Highest Honors, 1995, University of Maine at Orono. A portion of 
this Article was written while serving as an academic intern with the Highly Migratory 
Fish Species Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service in 1998. 
1. See PETER WEBER, ABANDONED SEAS: REVERSING TIIE DECLINE OF TIIE 
OCEANS 7 (1993). 
2. See PATRICIA w. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIIE 
ENVIRONMENT 251 (1992). 
3. The world population at the beginning of the century was only 1.6 billion. By 
the end of the century, it will have exploded to more than 6 billion people. Human 
numbers are growing at an astonishing rate of 88 million annually. See Christopher 
Flavin, The Legacy of Rio, in STATE OF TIIE WORLD 1997, at 3, 16 (Linda Starke ed. 
1997). 
4. The term "fishery" is defined as the business of catching, processing, or selling 
fish harvested from the ocean. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (6th ed. 1990). 
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creased as the limits of the resource's exploitability are being 
tested. Amid the concern for the resource lies a question that has 
been debated for decades: who should benefit from the ocean's 
fishery resource, and more importantly, who has the right to extract 
those resources from the ocean?5 
This question poses a special problem when dealing with the 
parts of the ocean that are not under exclusive control of any state.6 
In 1949, State Department official Walter Chapman noted that "fish 
caught on the high seas . . . were taken from international com­
mons, and those resources belonged to no one until their capture."7 
At that time, there were no laws that controlled unlimited fishing 
on the high seas, and \vith the increase in fishery technology, a great 
strain was placed on the world's fisheries.s 
Today, the strain on fisheries continues. Conservation meas­
ures have been taken to protect certain species and to regulate fish­
ing on the high seas. However, problems with over-exploitation 
remain. One such problem occurs when highly migratory species of 
fish are involved. Highly migratory species create a special prob­
lem in the fishery industry because they migrate in and out of the 
high seas, and thus in and out of the exclusive economic zones of 
various states.9 The question of conservation then becomes ex­
tremely difficult, and will require international cooperation to en­
sure that over-exploitation of the species does not occur. 
The regulation of swordfish and other highly migratory species 
takes place through international documents, such as the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,lO the 1966 Inter­
5. See H. GARY KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEA'S LIVING RESOURCES: LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 13-29 (1977). The debate about the ap­
propriation of ocean fishery resources has been ongoing since before the 15th century, 
when England became concerned about excluding foreign fisherman in coastal waters, 
and continued through the extended navigation of the worlds oceans, the effort of Spain 
and Portugal to reduce the Atlantic and Indian oceans to the status of lakes in the 16th 
century, the declaration of the concept of "freedom of the high seas" by domestic and 
international courts in the 18th century, and the development of international law and 
the creation of boundaries on the ocean. See id. 
6. The term "state" is used in this Article to refer to a nation state. 
7. LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE 
EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE 116 (1996). 
8. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 2, at 490. 
9. See Will Martin, Fisheries Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Stocks Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 765, 767 (1995). 
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. 
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national Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,11 and 
most recently, the 1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.12 Domestically, the 
regulation of swordfish is implemented through the Atlantic Tunas 
Conservation Act13 and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conserva­
tion and Management Act.14 This Article will analyze each of the 
above-listed management policies, implicate their strengths and 
weaknesses, and discuss proposed international and domestic policy 
changes to help conserve and manage the North Atlantic swordfish. 
Part I analyzes the past and present conditions of the North Atlan­
tic swordfish stock. Part II presents an overview of how interna­
tional regulations have attempted to set up a management regime 
for highly migratory fish species through the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1966 International Con­
vention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. Part III discusses 
the Atlantic Tunas Conservation Act and the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act as the United States 
domestic laws that regulate swordfish. Part IV analyzes the 1995 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Fmally, Part V pro­
poses recommendations for the future regulation of the North At­
lantic swordfish stock. 
1. 	 SWORDFISH AS A HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH: PAST AND 
PRESENT CONDITIONS OF THE STOCK 
To fully understand the unique problems that fisheries face, 
one must first look to the history of the stock and then compare 
that history to the present outlook. Swordfish are classified as a 
highly migratory fish because they migrate between the area of the 
high seas and the exclusive economic zones of various states.15 This 
analysis will show how domestic and international protection of the 
stock is vital for its long-term survival. 
Swordfish can grow to be a maximum of 445 centimeters in 
11. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for 
signature May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter Tuna Convention]. 
12. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened 
for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-97.1i (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
14. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
15. See Martin, supra note 9, at 767. 
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length, and can weigh up to 1,200 pounds.16 Swordfish inhabit most 
of the world's tropical and temperate oceansP Equipped with 
adapted specialized eyes18 that enable them to seek prey at great 
depths, swordfish feed principally at night on squid, herring, mack­
erel, tuna, and other fish.19 Their sword-like bills allow them to 
slash their prey, and their sleek body contours enable them to 
achieve great speed.20 
North Atlantic swordfish inhabit the Atlantic Ocean, including 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.21 The United States' 
Atlantic commercial swordfish industry, which harvests the North 
Atlantic swordfish, is believed to have been established in the early 
19th century as a harpoon fishery off the coast of New England.22 
Until 1962, fishing was confined to the area between New York and 
Canada, and virtually all swordfish caught were harpooned.23 How­
ever, beginning in the 1960s swordfish were targeted by longline 
vessels.24 Longlines are dragged behind vessels, stretch for tens of 
miles, and are covered with thousands of hooks.25 Thus, longlines 
allow fisherman to catch a number of fish at one time, as they do 
not need to rely solely on fish banking on the surface.26 In fact, 
longlines catch almost 98% of the United States' commercial 
swordfish caught in the North Atlantic.27 The most prevalent prob­
lem occurring with longline harvesting is the indiscriminate nature 
of the lines. The lines cannot focus on one species, nor can they 
focus on the maturity level of the species caught. This results in 
what is called a "by-catch."28 The by-catch consists of not just ma­
ture swordfish, but juvenile swordfish, various other fish species, 
16. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, DRAFT FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
PLAN FOR ATLANTIC TUNAS, SWORDFISH, AND SHARKS INCLUDING AN ENVIRONMEN­
TAL ASSESSMENT AND REGULATORY IMPACT REvIEW 6-80 (1998) [hereinafter DRAFT 
FMPj. 
17. See id. at 6-79. 
18. Swordfish have specially adapted eye muscles that produce heat and work to 
maintain brain and visual function, allowing them to hunt at great depths and frigid 
temperatures. See id. at 5-36. 
19. See id. at 6-79. 
20. See id. at 5-35 to -36. 
21. See id. at 6-79. 
22. See id. at 5-36. 
23. See id. at 5-37. 
24. See id. 
25. See J. Madeleine Nash, The Fish Crisis, TIME, Aug. 11,1997, at 65. 
26. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-59. 
27. See id. at 5-38. 
28. See MICHAEL BERRILL, THE PLUNDERED SEAS: CAN THE WORLD'S FISH BE 
SAVED? 62 (1997). 
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sea turtles, albatrosses, and sharks.29 Harpoon harvesting, at the 
very least, served to sustain the fisheries as only mature fish that 
had already had the time to spawn were taken.30 
Recently, domestic landings of commercially viable swordfish 
have declined steadily in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. On the 
East Coast, landings of swordfish have declined from around ten 
million pounds in the late 1980s to only about six million pounds in 
1995.31 On the West Coast, around Hawaii, the decline in the 
number of swordfish landings is said to have been the major factor 
in the 27% decrease in the overall fishery harvest between 1993 and 
1994 alone.32 In addition to the swordfish landed domestically, a 
large amount of swordfish is imported into the United States for 
consumption. In 1997, the United States imported 15.5 metric tons 
of swordfish from thirty-three different countries.33 This is esti­
mated to be about three times the amount of swordfish produced 
domestically in 1996 on the East and West Coasts combined.34 
The large amount of swordfish imported into the United States 
evidences the international character of the swordfish industry. 
The international character is further shown by the fact that sword­
fish are highly migratory species and travel over large distances, 
both in and out of the exclusive economic zones of states and in the 
areas of the high seas as well.35 Thus, the sustainable management 
of the swordfish industry depends on the effective cooperation of 
all countries harvesting them.36 
II. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
The international community has attempted to regulate fisher­
ies through the use of treaty provisions and through the use of do­
mestic regional fishery management programs. Traditionally, the 
law relating to the sea has been split into two categories of focus: 
the territorial seas and the high seas.37 The territorial seas are the 
29. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-58 to -59. 
30. See id. at 5-36 to -37. 
31. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Swordfish in the North Atlantic: The 
Case for Conservation (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.nrdc.org.nrdc.nrdcpro/water/ 
nasfrep.htmi> [hereinafter NRDC]. 
32. See Michael Travis, Economic Interactions Between U.S. Longline Fisheries 
(visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.soest.hawaii.eduIPFRP/travis.htmi>. 
33. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-42 to -43. 
34. See id. 
35. See Martin, supra note 9, at 767. 
36. See id. 
37. See Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Confer­
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designated areas along the coastlines of states where the states have 
complete jurisdiction and control; this includes control over all fish­
ing rights.38 The high seas are the area beyond the territorial seas 
over which no state has contro1.39 Traditionally, the high seas were 
never regulated for fisheries management.40 
In order to regulate the high seas, which were traditionally 
considered open to all states, there must be cooperation among all 
fishing nations. Fishing nations can be comprised of both coastal 
nations and those nations which are landlocked but have substantial 
enough fishing fleets to have a high seas fishery.41 These land­
locked nations are referred to as distant water fishing nations 
("DWFNs") and have different interests in the management of 
highly migratory fish stocks than do coastal states.42 Often, these 
nations want to keep the high seas free from regulation by coastal 
states in order to protect their right to exploit straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks.43 Coastal states control the resources in their 
coastal waters and can thereby regulate the fisheries found there.44 
Coastal states, therefore, have a direct economic interest in control­
ling any species found in their domestic waters, or which migrate in 
and out of those waters, whereas DWFNs may be interested only in 
the short-term economic benefit received from exploiting the stock. 
Therefore, coastal states and DWFNs have competing views over 
what type of fishery regulation should be implemented. 
In 1958, the First Geneva Conference of the Law of the Sea 
("UNCLOS I") took place.45 The conference produced four sepa­
rate treaties relating to the law of the sea: the Convention on the 
High Seas;46 the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
ence on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law ofFishing on the 
High Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 313, 315 (1996). 
38. See id.; see also Oda Shigeru, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 739 (1983). 
39. See Mack, supra note 37, at 315. 
40. See Jon L. Jacobson, International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L. 
REV. 1161, 1170 (1985). 
41. See Mack, supra note 37, at 316. 
42. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Modifying the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New 
Initiatives on Governance ofHigh Seas Fisheries Resources: The Straddling Stocks Nego­
tiations, 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 219, 221 (1995). 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. 1 D. P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 22 (I. A. Shearer 
ed.1982). 
46. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention]. 
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Zone;47 the Convention on the Continental Shelf;48 and the Con­
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas.49 UNCLOS I left the high seas open to all nations and 
gave all coastal and non-coastal states the freedom to fish on the 
high seas.50 In addition, UNCLOS I gave coastal states sovereign 
rights to natural resources over its continental shelf.51 
Most importantly, the Convention on Fishing and Conserva­
tion of Living Resources of the High Seas ("Fishery Convention") 
provided that states engaged in fishing for the same stock on the 
high seas shall enter into an agreement with one another to adopt 
necessary measures for the conservation of those stocks.52 The 
Fishery Convention also provided that if a state had a special inter­
est in maintaining stocks in the high seas adjacent to its territorial 
sea, it could adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate 
to any stock of fish provided that negotiations with the other con­
cerned states had not produced an agreement within six months.53 
However, under UNCLOS I, the state was not allowed to adopt 
such measures unless there was an urgent need for conservation, 
the measures were based on scientific findings, and the measures 
would not discriminate in form or fact against foreign fisherman.54 
In 1960, a second Geneva Conference was held to reach an 
agreement on the extent of the territorial sea.55 Nonetheless, no 
compromise was reached and the states began to unilaterally estab­
lish six mile territorial seas and six mile fishery zones. 56 The 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS 
111")57 was formed not to address territorial limits, but to address 
47. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for sig­
nature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea 
Convention]. 
48. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 
U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Convention]. 
49. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter 
Fishery Convention]. 
50. See High Seas Convention, supra note 46, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 
U.N.T.S. at 82. 
51. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 48, art. 2(1), 15 U.S.T. at 473, 
499 U.N.T.S. at 313, 315. 
52. See Fishery Convention, supra note 49, art. 4, 17 U.S.T. at 140, 559 U.N.T.S. 
at 288. 
53. See id. art. 7, 17 U.S.T. at 141, 559 U.N.T.S. at 290. 
54. See id. art. 7, 17 U.S.T. at 141-42, 559 U.N.T.S. at 292. 
55. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 24. 
56. See id. 
57. UNCLOS III, supra note 10. 
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the question of access to mineral resources.58 However, only a mi­
nority of states were interested due to the fact that few would actu­
ally benefit from such an agreement.59 Therefore, the Convention 
chose to instead adopt drastic proposals which would renovate all 
of the Geneva Conventions.60 
In the period between UNCLOS I, in 1958, and UNCLOS III, 
in 1982, an agreement was formed between states that had a com­
mon interest in maintaining the populations of tuna and tuna-like 
species existing in the Atlantic Ocean. This agreement was the 
1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas;61 it was the first international agreement to have an impact 
on the conservation and management of the North Atlantic sword­
fish. However, there are many weaknesses in both the provisions of 
the Convention and the powers of the commission which it estab­
lished to carry out its objectives. 
A. 	 Regulation of Fisheries Under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS III was the first major international instrument that 
attempted to set out jurisdictional and regulatory issues for fishery 
resources in the sea.62 For the most part, UNCLOS III was a codifi­
cation of customary international law and sought to "promote the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living re­
sources, and the study, protection, and preservation of the marine 
environment."63 
1. Fishery Management Under UNCLOS III 
UNCLOS III divided the waters off of coastal states into the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone 
("EEZ"), and the high seas. The territorial seas were extended to 
12 nautical miles64 from shore,65 the contiguous zone extended to 
58. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 25. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. Thna Convention, supra note 11. 
62. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 25. 
63. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10,21 I.L.M. at 1271; see also Suzanne Iudicello, 
Protecting Global Marine Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 120, 124 (Wil­
liam J. Snape III ed. 1996). 
64. A "nautical mile" is used to measure distance on the ocean and stretches 
6,080 feet, as opposed to a statutory mile of 5,280 feet, which is regularly used to mea­
sure distances. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (6th ed. 1990). 
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24 nautical miles,66 and the EEZs extended coastal state control to 
a maximum of 200 nautical miles from shore.67 Since over 90% of 
the world's commercial fisheries are contained within 200 nautical 
miles of the coasts, a vast amount of previously unregulated fisher­
ies were suddenly under state regulation.68 This change impacted 
the DWFNs by forcing them out of their traditional fishing areas 
and into the area of the high seas, where fishing is less regulated 
and not under the control of anyone state.69 
Within the EEZ, a coastal state has exclusive rights to explore, 
manage, and exploit living and non-living resources.7° These rights 
give the state the exclusive power to set quotas in the form of total 
allowable catch limits on the amount of living resources which can 
be taken from its EEZ.71 However, UNCLOS III also requires the 
state to take into account the best scientific data available in order 
to ensure the conservation and management of any living resource 
within its EEZ to protect it from over-exploitation.72 These meas­
ures, requiring the consideration of the best scientific data avail­
able, are designed to maintain or restore harvested species at levels 
which produce a maximum sustainable yield while taking into ac­
count many factors, including fishing patterns and the interdepen­
dence of any stock.73 
As far as fisheries on the high seas are concerned, UNCLOS 
III only slightly modified the principle of "freedom of the high 
seas."74 UNCLOS III recognized that all states, whether land­
65. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. 
66. See id. art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276. 
67. See id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. 
68. See Stuart Kaye, Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Convention, 70 
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 533, 533 (1996). 
69. See id. at 534. 
70. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 56(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1281. 
71. See id. art. 61, 21 I.L.M. at 1281. 
72. See id. art. 61(2), 21 I.L.M at 1281. 
73. See id. art. 61(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1281. 
74. The principle of "freedom of the high seas" is a customary law principle in 
international law. For the principle to arise, a significant number of states must engage 
in a practice that is accepted by a majority of states for a significant enough time so that' 
the practice becomes accepted as a rule of law. The customary practice of "freedom of 
the high seas" began as early as the 18th century and became recognized and affirmed 
by both international and domestic courts. See KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 17-18. The 
principle was also codified into international law in Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas which states that the high seas are open to all nations and no state may 
subject them to its sovereignty. See High Seas Convention, supra note 46, art. 2, 13 
U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82. The Convention listed the freedom of navigation, 
the freedom of fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipeline, and the freedom 
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locked or coastal, have the freedom to fish on the high seas.75 UN­
CLOS III narrowed this right slightly by stating that when 
exercising rights to fish on the high seas, states will be limited by 
their treaty obligations and the rights, duties, and interests of other 
states laid out within other provisions of UNCLOS IIU6 Freedom 
to fish on the high seas is thus no longer "an unfettered economic 
right."77 
The shift in concentrated fishing from the EEZs to the high 
seas has created problems for two types of commercial fisheries: 
straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks.78 Straddling stocks 
are fish species that lie partially within an EEZ and partially within 
the area of the high seas.79 They are usually found in areas of rela­
tively shallow waters above the continental shelf of a state ex­
tending beyond 200 nautical miles.80 Straddling stocks are 
distinguished from highly migratory species that do not remain in 
the waters close to the coast, but instead migrate over thousands of 
miles, entering the EEZs of several different states and also the 
high seas.81 As stated previously, swordfish are a highly migratory 
species. 
The articles of UNCLOS III include a provision relating specif­
ically to the issue of highly migratory fish species. According to this 
provision, states that fish for highly migratory species in a region 
must cooperate with any other state that fishes for the species in 
that region in order to ensure conservation of the stock.82 This co­
operation for conservation is needed to achieve the objective of op­
timum utilization of such species throughout that region, both 
within and beyond the EEZ.83 In order to achieve this cooperation, 
nations may work directly with one another or through appropriate 
to fly over the high seas as rights belonging to states subject to the reasonable regard for 
the interests of other nations. See id. art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82. 
75. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 87(l)(e), 211.L.M. at 1286-87. 
76. See id. art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290. 
77. Christopher C. Joyner, Ocean Fisheries, U.S. Interests, and the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995). 
78. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 534. 
79. See id. Straddling stocks are regulated under a separate provision of UN­
CLOS III. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 63, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
80. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 534. 
81. Cf. Martin, supra note 9, at 767. 
82. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. Annex I to the 
Convention lists what species are to be considered highly migratory fish stocks. Sword­
fish is among those species listed and thus falls under this provision. See id. annex I, 21 
I.L.M. at 1329. 
83. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
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international organizations.84 Where such international organiza­
tions do not exist, the provision requires that the states harvesting 
these highly migratory stocks in the region cooperate to establish 
such an association.85 
2. UNCLOS III and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
UNCLOS III, while encompassing provisions relating to th~ 
fishing of stocks both in the EEZ and the high seas, is lacking in its 
provisions regarding the conservation and management of highly 
migratory species. There are several reasons why this is true; 
among those reasons are the following: (1) the parties to the Con­
vention provided for the treaty to be adopted as a "package deal;" 
(2) the agreement failed to effectively provide for establishment of 
fishery management organizations; and (3) the agreement lacked 
necessary enforcement provisions. 
UNCLOS III was produced as a single treaty, encompassing 
over one hundred issues regarding the law of the sea; the topics of 
fisheries and scientific research encompass only a few of the issues 
addressed.86 As it was decided that the Convention should be 
adopted by consensus if possible, the Convention was likely negoti­
ated as a "package deal." Thus, states had to reach compromises 
on some of the issues in order to reach agreement on those issues 
which were of particular concern to them. The fisheries articles 
could not be separated from the articles governing the territorial 
sea, continental shelf, and high seas as they were in UNCLOS J.87 
As a result, compromises were often achieved through the use of 
ambiguous language and the exclusion of precise issues. For exam­
ple, issues such as a precise formula for the allocation of fish 
catches were left out of the agreement, intended to be dealt with by 
subsequent agreements between the states.88 
UNCLOS III also failed to deal effectively with the provisions 
84. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
85. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
86. See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 10. 
87. Compare UNCLOS III, supra note 10 (containing regulation of several topics 
within one document), with High Seas Convention, supra note 46 (regulating only the 
high seas), Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 47 (regulating only the territorial 
seas), Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 48 (regulating only the continental 
shelf), and Fishery Convention, supra note 49 (regulating only the conservation of liv­
ing resources). 
88. Cf. UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 211.L.M. at 1282 (requiring the crea­
tion of regional fishery management organizations to handle issues not clearly resolved 
by the Convention). 
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relating to the establishment of regional fishery management orga­
nizations. The provision relating to the regulation of highly migra­
tory fish species states that the parties shall cooperate in the 
management of these species either directly with one another or 
through an appropriate international organization.89 If there is no 
such organization, the states must then establish such an organiza­
tion comprised of those states which are harvesting the same spe­
cies within the region.90 
Nothing in the provisions require a state to work through an 
international regional organization. In fact, Article 64 lists direct 
agreement with another state as an option for dealing with highly 
migratory species.91 As a result, if some of the states involved are 
going through regional organizations, while others are making 
agreements with each other directly, a discrepancy may exist in the 
type of regulatory schemes used and the stringency, or lack thereof, 
in those schemes. In some cases, this will lead to stocks that mi­
grate between zones being under different management regimes, 
some being more protective or less protective of the species than 
others. This discrepancy between management regiI,lles reduces the 
effectiveness of the overall management and conservation of the 
species and may lead to a sharp decline in stocks. 
Another major flaw in Article 64 stems from the fact that no 
international guidelines were set for the development or operation 
of these organizations.92 As a result, several of the large interna­
tional fishery organizations have proven unsuccessful at conserving 
the highly migratory fish stocks.93 One factor contributing to their 
failure is the fact that several of the organizations are aimed at very 
specific, single-species regimes,94 Often their objectives for con­
serving a particular stock are based on the goal of maximizing the 
catch of that particular species, not conserving diversity.95 This goal 
of maximization can lead to the over-exploitation of other species 
89. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
90. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
91. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
92. See Mack, supra note 37, at 318. 
93. See Edward Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations Con­
vention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Prob­
lem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 343 (1989). These large fishery 
organizations include the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, which was organ­
ized to realize UNCLOS III principles for high seas fishing, and the International Com­
mission for the Conservation of Atlantic Thnas, which covers nearly all of the Atlantic 
Ocean and regulates swordfish in the North Atlantic. See id. at 344-45. 
94. See Iudicello, supra note 63, at 125. 
95. See id. 
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that may be essential to the survival of the species which the re­
gional organizations are trying to protect. This can indirectly de­
crease the stocks of the selected species. Another factor leading to 
unsuccessful efforts on the part of the international organizations 
stems from the fact that states may fail to comply with the general 
duty of cooperation or with the conservation and management 
measures agreed upon. Also, non-member states may simply ig­
nore the regulations set up by the regional organizations.96 
One of the predominant reasons for the general failure of in­
ternational regional organizations is the fact that UNCLOS III did 
not establish any guidelines or mechanisms for enforcement.97 As a 
result, the regional organizations formed under the agreement did 
not, themselves, specify effective enforcement mechanisms, and 
have thus had difficulty in obtaining their goal of managing particu­
lar fish stocks.98 In order to ensure successful enforcement of 
agreements such as UNCLOS III, procedures must be available for 
proper inspection of fishing practices, means must be provided to 
ensure that quotas are being adhered to, and there must be an abil­
ity to arrest and apply sanctions.99 UNCLOS III does not provide 
for any of these measures. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, for 
member states to ensure that other members and even non-mem­
bers are adhering to agreed upon standards of conservation and 
management. The agreement is weak in its provisions regarding 
highly migratory species, and the fact that there are no ample en­
forcement measures to ensure that even the basic provision is being 
followed further undermines the effectiveness of the treaty. 
One example of the ineffectiveness of UNCLOS III, due to 
lack of enforcement measures, is the disparity existing between the 
accountability of enforcement when the violation is taking place on 
the high seas as opposed to within territorial waters. Vessels on the 
high seas are accountable to the flag state and the laws imposed 
upon them by that state.lOO Flag states thus have the ability alone 
to prosecute the offender. This ability undermines any enforcement 
provision that an international regional organization may try to en­
act for the purpose of allowing the member states to enforce provi­
sions against one another.101 
96. See Mack, supra note 37, at 321. 
97. See id.; see also Iudicello, supra note 63, at 124. 
98. See Mack, supra note 37, at 321. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. at 322. 
101. See id. 
18 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:5 
The ineffectiveness of UNCLOS III in dealing effectively with 
the management and conservation of highly migratory fish stocks 
has resulted in states enacting unilateral measures to regulate these 
stockS.102 One example of such action is found in the recent adop­
tion of legislation by Canada prohibiting all fishing of straddling 
stocks off its coasts and in the high seas adjacent to Northwest At­
lantic Fisheries Organization ("NAFO") territory.103 The legisla­
tion also made an attempt to enforce conservation measures 
beyond Canada's EEZ by allowing Canada to seize foreign vessels 
violating the regulations of NAFO.l04 A continuing legal contro­
versy has thus developed with Spain since March 9, 1995, when a 
Spanish ship was seized on the high seas under the belief that it was 
engaging in illegal fishing. lo5 Spain filed an Application with the 
International Court of Justice alleging that the action violated vari­
ous principles and norms of international law and has stated that 
the dispute with Canada went to "the very principle of the freedom 
of the high seas, and moreover, implied a very serious infringement 
of the sovereign rights of Spain."l06 
Not only does this approach lead to disputes among states and 
discourage cooperation, but it also leads to inconsistent fishery 
management programs. As discussed previously, this will often 
lead to stocks that migrate between zones that are under different 
102. See id.; see also Joyner, supra note 77, at 750. 
103. See An Act to Amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, May 12, 1994, 
R.S.c., ch. 14 (1994) (Can.); Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994,33 
I.L.M. 1383 (containing an unofficial version of the original act and its amendments); 
see also Mack, supra note 37, at 323; Miles & Burke, supra note 93, at 344-45; Kaye, 
supra note 68, at 534. 
104. See Mack, supra note 37, at 323. 
105. See id. 
106. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 9 Hague Y.B. Int'l L. 120, 121 (1996). 
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") ruled on the matter on December 4, 1998. 
At the time of printing of this Article, the court's ruling had not yet been officially 
published. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the court determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction to settle the dispute between Canada and Spain. See Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(Spain v. Canada) (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlied 
iecjudgment(s)/iec_ijudgmenC981204_frame.htm>. Under Article 36 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, states may unilaterally formulate, limit, modify, and 
terminate their declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. 
See id. On May 10, 1994, Canada submitted to the court a declaration of submission to 
compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes arising after that declaration, with the excep­
tion of cases arising out of certain specified circumstances. See id. One of those speci­
fied circumstances related to disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and 
management of vessels fishing in the NAFO area. See id. The court ruled that the 
present dispute between Canada and Spain fell within the exception, and thus the court 
had no jurisdiction to decide the case. See id. 
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management regimes, some being more protective or less protec­
tive of the species than others. This reduces the effectiveness of the 
overall management and conservation of the species and has played 
a role in leading to the decline in stocks. 
UNCLOS III was designed to reverse the apparent disturbing 
trend of over-exploitation of fisheries. 107 As such, UNCLOS III 
managed to change what was once an unfettered right to fish on the 
high seas into a right that is now subject to conditions. UNCLOS 
III also established clear geographic zones for coastal state jurisdic­
tion off-shore and makes it plain that there is a duty for coastal 
states to conserve the fishery resources in those areas. lOB 
Most importantly, UNCLOS III addressed the issue of highly 
migratory fish stocks for the first time. Its provisions required 
states to cooperate with other states regarding the conservation of 
these species.109 However, UNCLOS III has far from managed to 
provide for a comprehensive regime regarding the management of 
highly migratory species. The "package deal" way in which the 
treaty was adopted resulted in "watered down" provisions for fish­
ery management. Much of the regime for conservation was left to 
the individual states, to be decided upon in agreements with one 
another. Leaving the power to the individual states has created a 
wide diversity of conservation and management plans in various re­
gions.110 As a result, highly migratory fish stocks are protected 
more in some regions than others, and the effectiveness of conser­
vation measures are weakened. 
Conservation and management of highly migratory stocks has 
also suffered due to the failure and general ineffectiveness of inter­
national regional bodies. UNCLOS III did not provide guidelines 
for the creation and management of international regional bodies 
and, consequently, conservation of the stocks has suffered. In addi­
tion, UNCLOS III did not include substantial enforcement meas­
ures and guidelines, thus making the work of the regional 
management bodies even more difficult. The variation in conserva­
tion plans, the weak treaty provisions, and the lack of enforcement 
measures have undermined the entire purpose of the fisheries sec­
tion of the treaty, that being to conserve the world's fishery 
resources. 
107. See Joyner, supra note 77, at 750. 
108. See id. 
109. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
110. See generally BERRILL, supra note 28. 
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UNCLOS III merely provides a broad legal framework from 
which the individual states are to build upon with the enactment of 
their own agreements. However, in order to effectively manage 
highly migratory fish that cross regional boundaries, a broad, com­
prehensive management scheme is needed. It is possible that the 
1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks111 may fill that void. This Article dis­
cusses the agreement in Part v. 
B. 	 The International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic. 
Tunas 
Prior to the UNCLOS III treaty, the only other international 
agreement which had an impact on the conservation and manage­
ment of the North Atlantic Swordfish was the International Con­
vention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("Tuna 
Convention").uz In 1966, the Tuna Convention was formed among 
states that had a common interest in maintaining the populations of 
tuna and tuna-like species existing in the Atlantic Ocean at a level 
that would produce a maximum sustainable yield.113 Under the 
provisions of the Tuna Convention, an International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("ICCAT") was formed.u4 
ICCAT is the main agency responsible for carrying out the objec­
tives of the Tuna Convention, which includes studying the popula­
tions of tuna and tuna-like species.llS ICCAT involves over twenty­
two nations in the managing of tuna, swordfish, sailfish, and marlin 
throughout the Atlantic.116 ICCAT is among the largest of the in­
ternational regional fishery organizations that states can turn to in 
order to form an agreement regarding the conservation and man­
agement of any highly migratory stock under UNCLOS IIU17 
The jurisdiction of the Tuna Convention extends to all waters 
111. 	 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12. 
112. 	 Thna Convention, supra note 11. 
113. 	 See id. preamble, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64. 
114. 	 See id. art. III(l), 20 U.S.T. at 2889, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64, 66. 
115. 	 See id. art. JV(l), 20 U.S.T. at 2890-91, 673 U.N.T.S. at 66, 68. 
116. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768. The Convention originally was designed to 
regulate tuna in the North Atlantic; however, at a special meeting of the Commission in 
1982, the Portuguese delegation proposed that the Convention be amended to include 
all of the highly migratory species laid out in UNCLOS III. A protocol to amend the 
Convention was agreed upon in Paris in 1984. See id. 
117. Article 64 of UNCLOS III allows for the creation of organizations such as 
the ICCAT. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. 
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of the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas.us This jurisdiction pro­
vides a regime that encompasses the fish stocks of the Atlantic 
Ocean and the adjacent seas to which they may also migrate. It is 
important to note that the jurisdiction of the Tuna Convention in­
cludes areas of national jurisdiction as well as areas which are high 
seas.119 However, Article 2 states that nothing in the Tuna Conven­
tion shall be considered as affecting the rights, claims, or views of 
any of the contracting parties with regard to the limits of the territo­
rial waters or the extent of jurisdiction over the fisheries under in­
ternational law.120 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Tuna 
Convention may extend into the areas under state control only to 
the extent those states believe that the Tuna Convention is not in­
terfering with the rights and claims that the states have under inter­
national law regarding those areas. This limit on the extent of 
control in state waters reduces the effectiveness of the Tuna Con­
vention in fully protecting highly migratory fish stocks throughout 
their entire range. 
ICCAT may, based on scientific evidence, make any recom­
mendations it believes are needed to maintain the populations of 
highly migratory fish species at a level which will produce the maxi­
mum sustainable catch.121 Each recommendation made becomes 
effective upon all of the parties six months after the date of 
notification.122 
However, the Tuna Convention's effectiveness is undermined 
by its provision allowing member states to submit an objection to 
the recommendation within that six month period.123 If a majority 
of the member states have lodged objections, the recommendation 
will not be binding; if the objections are lodged by more than one­
fourth of the members, but not by the majority, the recommenda­
tion is effective as to only those states who did not object; and if the 
objections are lodged by less than one-fourth of the members, the 
recommendation becomes effective for all states unless the ob­
118. See Tuna Convention, supra note 11, art. I, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 V.N.T.S. at 
64. 
119. See id. art. I, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64; see also Evelyne Meltzer, 
Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable 
Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 255, 319 (1994). 
120. See Tuna Convention, supra note 11, art. II, 20 V.S.T. at 2888, 673 V.N.T.S. 
at 64. 
121. See id. art. VIII(I)(a), 20 U.S.T. at 2894, 673 U.N.T.S. at 70, 72. 
122. See id. art. VIII(2), 20 U.S.T. at 2895, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72. 
123. See id. art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2895-97, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72, 74. 
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jecting parties reaffirm their objections.124 The objection procedure 
allows certain members to escape from complying with recommen­
dations which may conserve and manage the species affected in or­
der to ensure that it is not over-exploited. This procedure can 
result in the uneven conservation of a highly migratory stock be­
cause the stock may migrate between the waters of states that are 
following the recommendations for that species and the waters of 
states that are not following the recommendations. 
Furthermore, ICCAT does not have regulatory power. ICCAT 
can only make recommendations for the conservation of the rele­
vant species.125 Since ICCAT has no authority to enforce its recom­
mendations, its effectiveness as a management mechanism depends 
not only on its ability to make wise recommendations, but also on 
the willingness of the harvesting states to implement them.126 This 
is true for all regional fishery organizations and, as discussed previ­
ously, UNCLOS III did not do anything to strengthen the authority 
of those organizations.127 
Problems have arisen in the past due to the refusal of key fish­
ing nations to sign on to the agreement.128 The Tuna Convention's 
purpose is further undermined by this refusal. Large fishing nations 
have fleets that can exploit a substantial amount of a fishery stock 
in several different areas of the ocean, not only in their own juris­
dictions, but on the high seas and in the territories of nations with 
whom they have agreements.129 With member nations lacking the 
ability to enforce provisions and recommendations of the Tuna 
Convention upon non-member states, the future of highly migra­
tory fish species is in peril.130 The lack of enforcement, combined 
with the jurisdictional problems and the difficulties regarding the 
authority to regulate, creates a convention that has been less than 
effective in managing and conserving highly migratory species. In 
fact, the ineffectiveness of the Tuna Convention has earned it a 
nickname among many experts as being the "international conven­
124. See id. art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2896-97, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72, 74. 
125. See Christopher Weld, Critical Evaluation of Existing Mechanisms for Man­
aging Highly Migratory Pelagic Species in the Atlantic Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L 
LJ. 285, 288 (1989). 
126. See id. 
127. See Mack, supra note 37, at 321. 
128. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768. 
129. See BERRlLL, supra note 28, at 26-27. 
130. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text for a discussion about the 
lack of enforcement of provisions and recommendations of the Thna Convention. 
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tion to catch all the tuna."131 
III. DOMESTIC REGULATION 
In addition to regulation under international law, the United 
States has its own domestic legislation regulating fisheries. In 1975, 
Congress enacted the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act132 to imple­
ment the provisions of the Tuna Convention. Also, the 1976 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
("Magnuson-Stevens Act") was passed in recognition of increased 
fishing pressure and the inadequacies of the present fishery conser­
vation management and control.133 The Magnuson-Stevens Act 
was implemented to provide a domestic solution· to the regulation 
of fisheries found off the coast of the United States. The Act estab­
lished a fishery conservation zone ("FCZ") which extended 200 
nautical miles from shore and gave the United States exclusive 
management authority. over all living resources within that zone.134 
A. The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 
The Tuna C~nvention is not self-executing;135 thus, the United 
States, after signing and ratifying the document, had to implement 
the treaty into its own domestic law system through the enactment 
of legislation.136 The United States signed the Tuna Convention on 
May 14, 1966, and on March 1, 1967, the United States Senate gave 
its advice and consent to ratification.137 The United States did not, 
however, implement corresponding domestic legislation until 1975 
with the enactment of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act 
(" ATCA").138 
Under ATCA, the United States Secretary of Commerce is au­
thorized and directed to enforce all of the provisions in the Tuna 
131. Iudicello, supra note 63, at 125. 
132. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-70, 89 Stat. 385 (codi­
fied as amended at 16 V.S.C. §§ 971-971i (1994 & Supp. III 1997». 
133. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 
§ 2, 90 Stat. 331, 331-32 (codified as amended at 16 V.S.c. § 1801 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997». 
134. See 16 V.S.c. §§ 1811-1812 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
135. See Thna Convention, supra note 11, art. XIV(2), 20 V.S.T. at 2904, 673 
V.N.T.S. at 82. 
136. See id. art. XIV, 20 V.S.T. at 2904, 673 V.N.T.S. at 82. 
137. See id. art. XIV, 20 U.S.T. at 2887, 673 V.N.T.S. at 63. 
138. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-70, 89 Stat. 385 (codi­
fied as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 971-971i (1994 & Supp. III 1997». 
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Convention and in ATCA itself.139 In carrying out these functions, 
the Secretary is also authorized to adopt such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of ATCA and 
the Tuna Convention.140 Among the regulations that may be 
adopted are the select regulation of anyone or more of the species 
covered by the Tuna Convention, the establishment of open and 
closed fishery seasons for various stocks, the limitation on the size 
and quantity of the catch of a species, and the requirement that 
observers be allowed fishing vessels for the purpose of gathering 
scientific data.141 
ATCA contains a section providing the United States with en­
forcement measures to ensure that the regulations of the Act and 
the regulations of the Tuna Convention are met.142 The enforce­
ment provisions, although allowing for greater authority than that 
provided for in the Tuna Convention, are only made available to 
the United States for enforcement against vessels under United 
States jurisdiction.143 In order to have any enforcement power 
against foreign vessels not under the jurisdiction of the United 
States, there must be an agreement made specifically between the 
United States and the other member state.144 The enforcement 
measures available to the United States for the regulation of vessels 
under its jurisdiction and vessels under the jurisdiction with which it 
has an agreement include the following: (1) the boarding of a vessel 
in order to inspect the vessel and the catch, as well as the ability to 
arrest persons aboard the vessel if found in violation; (2) the ability 
to arrest, with or without a warrant, any person who violates any 
regulation; and (3) the ability to seize, whenever and wherever law­
fully found, all fish taken or retained by a vessel in violation of the 
ATCA or provisions of the Tuna Convention.145 
As far as the regulation of swordfish as a highly migratory fish 
stock, these enforcement provisions accomplish more in the way of 
ensuring conservation and management than the Tuna Convention 
itself. However, it is questionable whether this is enough. The Sec­
retary of Commerce is authorized to adopt such regulations that are 
139. See 16 U.S.C. § 971d(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
140. See id. 
141. See id. § 971d(c)(3). 
142. See infra note 145 and accompanying text for a list of the enforcement meas­
ures available. 
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 97lf(a). 
144. See id. § 971f(b). 
145. See id. § 971f(a). 
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necessary to carry out the provisions of the Thna Convention;146 
however, there seems to be no requirement that these regulations 
go beyond the measures called for by the Tuna Convention. The 
Secretary may adopt measures, such as mandatory observers 
aboard fishing vessels and limit open seasons for certain fisheries, 
but is not required to do so under ATCA. 
Additionally, enforcement provisions are available to the 
United States to regulate only vessels under its jurisdiction and 
those vessels of foreign nations with whom the United States has an 
agreement. Although more effective than the Thna Convention in 
the way of enforcement, ATCA only provides a method of ensuring 
conservation within the areas under the jurisdiction of the United 
States and not on the high seas.147 The only vessels that the United 
States may enforce provisions against in those areas are vessels reg­
istered in the United States and vessels of agreeing foreign na­
tions.148 Any vessel violating a provision under the Tuna 
Convention which is under the jurisdiction of another state and op­
erating on the high seas cannot be punished. Most often this situa­
tion occurs with non-member states fishing on the high seas. As 
emphasized previously, highly migratory species are in need of 
comprehensive and consistent regulation that spans over their en­
tire migratory range. With no way to enforce conservation meas­
ures against the entire range of states that may be in violation, the 
Tuna Convention remains fairly ineffective. 
The ATCA, through recent amendments, requires the Secre­
tary to request ICCAT to adopt recommendations necessary for the 
conservation of Atlantic swordfish.149 These provisions require that 
the Secretary recommend to ICCAT the "establishment of an inter­
national minimum harvest size and a reduction in harvest levels to 
the extent necessary to conserve the stock."150 These provisions re­
veal that the United States recognizes the urgency of conservation 
action for the Atlantic swordfish. The United States, as a coastal 
state, has an interest in the long-term management of all highly mi­
gratory species due to its dependence on those fisheries within its 
EEZ. This interest, however, does not change the lack of enforce­
146. See id. § 971d(a). 
147. See id. 
148. See id. § 971d. 
149. See id. § 971d(d)(2); see also Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 207, 104 Stat. 4436, 4462 (amending 16 U.S.c. § 971d so as to 
require requests for recommendations). 
150. 16 U.S.c. § 971d(d)(2). 
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ment within th~ Thna Convention regime, even if these measures 
were to be implemented. 
In addition to the above-mentioned new development, another 
provision recently added to ATCA provides that the Secretary shall 
act in cooperation with an advisory committee and requires ICCAT 
to "develop and implement a comprehensive research and monitor­
ing program to support the conservation and management ... of 
highly migratory species."15I The program monitors highly migra­
tory fish stocks and assists in defining their range throughout the 
Atlantic Ocean, along with population numbers and life-cycle anal­
ysis.152 This research and monitoring program will aid in support­
ing any management or conservation measures taken by ensuring 
that the measures will be adopted according to the specific popula­
tion size, range, and needs of the species. 
B. 	 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976 
United States federal fishery regulations are provided for in 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act,153 Th~ Magnuson-Stevens Act was passed in recognition of 
both increased fishing pressure and the inadequacies of the present 
fishery conservation management and control,154 The Magnuson­
Stevens Act was thus meant to provide a domestic solution to the 
regulation of fisheries found off the coast of the United States. This 
solution to the regulation of fisheries was done through the estab­
lishment of a fishery co.nservation zone, which extended 200 nauti­
cal miles from shore and gave the United States exclusive 
management authority over all living resources within that zone.155 
As such, the FCZ is different from the EEZ established under UN­
CLOS III, which enabled the United States to extend its 200 nauti­
cal mile jurisdiction over all living and non-living resources within 
that area.156 
151. Id. § 971i(b); see also Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, § 303,109 
Stat. 366, 383 (1995) (adding the requirement to develop and implement a monitoring 
program to 16 U.S.c. § 971i). . 
152. 	 See 16 U.S.c. § 971i(b)(2). 
153. 	 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
154. 	 See id. § 1801(a)(2). 
155. 	 See id. §§ 1811-1812. 
156. 	 See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 56, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. 
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1. 	 The Role of Fishery Management Councils in the 
Conservation of the North Atlantic Swordfish 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act established eight regional fishery 
Management councils: the New England Council, Mid-Atlantic 
Council, South Atlantic Council, Caribbean Council, Gulf Council, 
Pacific Council, North Pacific Council, and the Western Pacific 
Council.157 Originally, the function of these councils was to prepare 
fishery management plans ("FMPs") with respect to each fishery 
within its geographical jurisdiction that might require conservation 
and management.158 In 1990, however, as a result of the passage of 
the Fishery Conservation Amendments, the authority to prepare 
FMPs was handed over to the National Marine Fisheries Service 
("NMFS"), under the Secretary of Commerce.159 The councils now 
play more of a consultative role. They are responsible for making 
recommendations to the Secretary concerning any activity they be­
lieve may jeopardize the existence of one or more of the species in 
their geographical area.1OO 
Each of the FMPs must contain, among other things, the fol­
lowing: (1) conservation and management measures applicable to 
United States and foreign fishery vessels which are necessary for 
the conservation and management of the species, (2) a full descrip­
tion of the fishery, (3) an assessment of the present and probable 
future condition of the stock and its measurement of maximum sus­
tainable yield, (4) the capacity of the United States fishing vessels 
to harvest an optimal yield each year, (5) pertinent data relating to 
how the fish are caught and where, and (6) available information 
regarding the significance of the habitat to the fishery and the im­
pacts changes to the habitat would have upon that species.161 A 
new provision of the Magnuson-Stevens Act now requires that the 
FMPs include a fishery impact statement that deals with the likely 
effects of the plan or amendment on the participants in the fishery 
and on the participants in adjacent areas under the authority of an­
other counci1.162 
157. See 16 u.s.c. § 1852(a)(1). 
158. See id. § 1851(h). 
159. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110, 
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997». 
160. See Atlantic Tunas Conservation Act Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 779 
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management, 103d Congo 82 (1993) [hereinafter At­
lantic Tunas Hearing] (testimony of the Center for Marine Conservation). 
161. See 16 U.S.c. § 1851(a). 
162. See id. 
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The Magnuson-Stevens Act did not provide for the regulation 
of highly migratory species within the established FCZ of the 
United States until amendments were passed in 1990,163 Prior to 
1990, the Magnuson-Stevens Act provided solely for exclusive fish­
ery management authority over fish in the FCZ that were not 
highly migratory species.164 The Magnuson-Stevens Act did pro­
vide, however, that the United States must support and encourage 
the implementation and enforcement of all international agree­
ments regarding these stocks.165 Additionally, the Magnuson-Ste­
vens Act stated that the Secretary may provide for the preparation 
and implementation of FMPs for each fishery that extends beyond 
the geographical jurisdiction of one of the councils.166 With the 
passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the addition of highly 
migratory species to those fisheries under the jurisdiction of the 
United States, the Secretary was then required to prepare or update 
already existing FMPs for those species.167 However, the creation 
of FMPs was extremely slow and the process of creating them for 
highly migratory species took several years.168 The delay was par­
tially caused by the change in authority to create FMPs from the 
regional organizations to the Secretary, stemming from passage of 
the amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1990.169 
2. 	 The Fishery Management Plan for the North Atlantic 
Swordfish 
In September of 1985, the Fishery Management Councils de­
veloped an FMP for the North Atlantic swordfish.170 Since 1990, 
however, the NMFS has had the authority to implement the devel­
opment of FMPs, and has thus had the ability to update the North 
Atlantic swordfish FMP.l7l Continuous updates have been made to 
163. See generally Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101­
627, 104 Stat. 4436 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997)). 
164. See 16 U.S.C. § 1813 (1988) (amended 1990). 
165. See id. § 1801(b)(2), (4). 
166. See id. § 1854(f). 
167. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110, 
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
168. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 77 (testimony of the Center 
for Marine Conservation). 
169. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110, 
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
170. See 50 c.F.R. pt. 630 (1997) (setting forth the fishery management plan for 
North Atlantic swordfish). 
171. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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the FMP for highly migratory species to account for the change in 
the United States' authority status over the species: in the interna­
tional agreements regulating the stock, in recommendations and 
provisions of the ATCA (as it implements the Tuna Convention), in 
provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and in changes to the fish­
ery stock itself.172 However, these updates were slow to develop 
and efforts by the Secretary to exercise responsible management 
over highly migratory species was curtailed for some time by Con­
gress' failure to appropriate the necessary level of funds to the 
Highly Migratory Species Unit established within the NMFSp3 
The FMP provisions require that all United States' vessels fish­
ing for swordfish in the North Atlantic Ocean, including the Gulf of 
Mexico and Caribbean Sea, be issued a permit for such activity.174 
The FMP provisions also require that a proper record be kept by 
each vessel regarding all swordfish harvesting and containing the 
details required by the regulations.175 Most importantly, the FMP 
for North Atlantic swordfish provides an annual update of harvest 
limitations and quotas for the stock. The information upon which 
the harvest limitations are based is the best scientific data regarding 
the abundance of the stock, the present catch and effort in the in­
dustry, and recommendations by ICCAT.176 The annual quota is 
divided into two semi-annual quotas for each of the six month peri­
ods, June 1st through November 30th, and December 1st through 
May 31stP7 The NMFS is required to monitor the catch and land­
ing statistics, and based on these statistics, to project a date when 
the catch will equal the quota, and to announce the closure of the 
fishery.178 
In October of 1997, consistent with ICCAT recommendations, 
NMFS established a United States' quota for the North Atlantic 
swordfish industry of 2,464 metric tons dressed weight ("mt dw").179 
The 1997 quota was then divided between the directed fishery 
172. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 1-1 to -3. 
173. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 78 (testimony of the Center 
for Marine Conservation). 
174. See 50 C.F.R. § 630.4. 
175. See id. § 630.5. 
176. See id. § 630.24(d)(1). 
177. See id. § 630.24. 
178. See id. § 630.25(a)(1). 
179. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55,357, 55,358 (1997). "Dressed weight" is the weight of the 
carcass after the fish is gutted and the head and fins are removed (dressed weight =0.75 
x whole weight). See Atlantic Swordfish Oversight: Hearing on the Conservation and 
Management ofAtlantic Swordfish Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Con­
servation and the Environment, 101st Congo 110, 111 (1990) [hereinafter Atlantic Sword­
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(2,164 mt dw) and the incidental fishery (300 mt dw),180 The di­
rected fishery was then divided into separate quotas for longline/ 
harpoon fishing (2,121.2 mt dw) and drift gillnet fishing (42.8 mt 
dW),18I 
In December of 1997, however, a rule was passed under the 
Endangered Species Act that closed the drift gillnet sector of the 
swordfish industry until August of 1998, to avoid jeopardizing the 
continued existence of the Northern right whale.182 Thus, the quota 
for the 1997 season was based on those quotas set for longline and 
harpoon fishing alone. This number is divided between the two 
semi-annual periods, allowing for a quota of 1,060.6 mt dw for each 
session. The NMFS used the actual landing numbers for the first 
two months of the second session (December 1997 and January 
1998) along with projected figures of the landings for February and 
March of 1998 (based on the three previous seasons) to determine 
that the quota for that session would be reached by March of 
1998.183 
In response, NMFS closed the fishery as of March 31, 1998, so 
as not to exceed the United States' quotas and risk penalties under 
ICCAT.I84 ATCA, which is carrying out the recommendations of 
ICCAT, provides that it is a violation to not comply with regula­
tions required to be promulgated which establish the quantity of 
fish that may be taken within anyone season.185 Additionally, 
ATCA provides that no regulation can be promulgated having the 
effect of increasing or decreasing any allocation or quota that has 
been agreed upon pursuant to a recommendation by ICCAT.186 A 
recommendation is binding on the parties of ICCAT unless they 
have specifically objected during the six month period allotted.187 
This system ensures that the United States does not exceed sword­
fish quotas under ATCA, which carries out the recommendations of 
the ICCAT, or the Magnuson-Stevens Act. However, if the set 
fish Hearing] (testimony of William W. Fox, Jr., Assistant Administrator of Fisheries, 
NOAA). 
180. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 55,358. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. at 63,467; see also Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1544 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
183. See 63 Fed. Reg. 12,687, 12,687 (1998). 
184. See id. 
185. See 16 U.S.c. § 971d(c)(3)(D) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
186. See id. § 971d(c)(3). 
187. See Thna Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2895, 673 
U.N.T.S. at 72. 
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quotas. are above where they should be for the maximum sustaina­
ble yield of the fishery, this effort will not be effective for conserva­
tion and management. 
The survival of the species is also dependent on the number of 
mature females available in the stock for spawning.188 Although 
harvesting is limited by quotas, and the amount of swordfish caught 
is being regulated, there is an additional problem with the individ­
ual sizes of the fish that make up the harvest.189 Thus, minimum 
size and weight requirements· are needed to ensure that a large 
amount of the fishery harvest is not composed of immature fish. 
The lower the required weight and size restrictions, the higher the 
amount of immature fish that are being exploited, which greatly di­
minishes the ability of the stocks to replenish. 
The female swordfish grows much more rapidly than the male, 
but reaches its maturity at a much later date. Virtually all male 
swordfish reach maturity before or at 90 pounds, yet only half of 
female swordfish are mature at that weight.190 This discrepancy 
would not create as much of an impact on the species if the mini­
mum weight for capture was set above a level where the majority of 
the female swordfish caught would consist of mature adults. How­
ever, since minimum weight levels have been set at numbers far 
below 90 pounds, the fisheries, while capped by the amount of fish 
they may harvest, have been harvesting more and more immature 
fish. 191 This harvesting of greater numbers of immature fish has re­
sulted in a decrease in the average size of swordfish caught and has 
forced stock numbers to decline substantially. The average size of 
the commercially caught swordfish has declined from over 266 
pounds, dressed weight, in 1963 to 90 pounds, dressed weight, in 
1995.192 An average harvested weight in 1995 led to more than 
83% of the female swordfish and 36% of the male swordfish caught 
by the domestic industry in the North Atlantic consisting of imma­
ture fish.193 
The ICCAT recommendations and the policies implemented 
under the FMPs have failed substantially to recognize this problem 
188. See infra text accompanying notes 190-194. 
189. See infra text accompanying notes 190-191. 
190. See Atlantic Swordfish Hearing, supra note 179, at 112 (testimony of William 
W. Fox, Jr., Assistant Administrator of Fisheries, NOAA). 
191. See infra note 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the amount of 
juvenile fish caught. 
192. See NRDC, supra note 31. 
193. See id. 
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of the over-harvesting of immature swordfish. In 1997, the mini­
mum allowable size for a swordfish taken in the North Atlantic was 
29 inches long, with carcass length measured along contour, and 33 
pounds, dressed weight.194 This weight is far below the weight nec­
essary for female swordfish to reach a proper maturity level for 
spawning.195 Therefore, regulations regarding the amount of 
swordfish that may be .harvested have less of an effect if the landed 
swordfish are permitted to be well below the age of maturity. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act has extensive regulations covering 
highly migratory fish species and aiming to ensure for their conser­
vation and survival,196 However, the swordfish levels are at the 
present level for several reasons, a few of which may be attributable 
to the Magnuson-Stevens Act itself. FMPs are now the responsibil­
ity of the Secretary of Commerce, and as such the regional organi­
zations that have jurisdiction over the species have been reduced to 
a consultative role. The regional organizations are now responsible 
for merely making comments and recommendations concerning any 
activity they believe may have an effect on the conservation and 
management of species within their geographical jurisdictions,197 
This change in authority led to a slowing down of management.198 
Several years passed before the NMFS had established new 
FMPs for certain highly migratory species.199 The lack of funding 
for proper scientific and management studies, along with the slow 
process of the federal agency action, put highly migratory species at 
great risk of inadequate protection.2°O It is questionable whether 
the movement of the responsibility of management from the re­
gional organizations to the Secretary will result in the best manage­
ment of the species. The regional councils have the ability to work 
together to come up with plans for species that range over two or 
more of the geographical areas.201 The regional councils are closer 
194. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55,357, 55,362 (1997). 
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text for a discussion on the maturing 
of female swordfish. 
196. There are a few specific provisions in the Magnuson-Stevens Act relating 
directly to highly migratory species. See 16 U.S.CO §§ 1812, 1822 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997). 
197. See id. § 1854. 
198. See supra note 168-69 and accompanying text for a discussion on the delays 
caused by the change in authority over the FMPs. 
199. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 78 (testimony of the Center 
for Marine Conservation). 
200. See id. 
201. For a discussion on localizing fishery management, see BERRILL, supra note 
28, at 110-12. 
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to the regions and are more likely to know first hand of the intrica­
cies of regional fisheries.202 Removal of decision-making to the 
Secretary not only burdens the NMFS with several different species 
to cover and plan for, but also moves the decision-making to an 
agency that is grossly underfunded for this type of venture.203 
IV. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE: THE 1995 CONVENTION AND 

MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND 

HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS 

In the late 1980s, prominent EEZ states saw their major fish 
stocks declining, mostly due to domestic harvesting.204 Since highly 
migratory and straddling fish stocks cross EEZ boundaries and high 
sea areas, it was clear that stricter management of these species was 
needed on the high seas.20S Thus, prominent EEZ states brought 
the problem to the attention of the 1992 United Nations Confer­
ence on Environment and Development ("UNCED"), or the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro.206 UNCED adopted what is known as 
Agenda 21, which encompassed a call for a new intergovernmental 
conference to address specifically the deficiencies in the legal re­
gime for high seas fisheries under UNCLOS 111.207 The United Na­
tions General Assembly endorsed the call for the conference, and 
subsequently negotiations began.208 
The conference was convened to elaborate on the framework 
provisions of Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS III, relating to strad­
dling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, respectively.209 
The goals of the conference were to identify and analyze the ex­
isting problems related to the conservation and management of 
these species, to consider means of improving cooperation among 
states, and to formulate appropriate recommendations.210 Recom­
mendations were to be made under the framework of UNCLOS III 
202. See id. 
203. See supra notes 167-69, 173 and accompanying text. 
204. See Alison Rieser, International Fisheries Law, Overfishing and Marine Bi­
odiversity, 9 OEO. INT'L ENVIL. L. REv. 251, 265-66 (1997). 
205. See id. at 266. 
206. See id.; see also Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of the High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 255, 323 (1994). 
207. See Rieser, supra note 204, at 266. 
208. See id. 
209. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768. 
210. See A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference Prepared by the Chair­
man, at 1, U.N. Doc. A1CONF.I64/lO (1993). 
34 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:5 
by clarifying and strengthening the relevant rights and duties of 
states as they pertain to fishing these stocks on the high seas.211 
The need for a new regime for fisheries on the high seas be­
came even more apparent during the conference when Canada took 
unilateral action and amended its Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 
to allow its vessels to patrol and enforce conservation measures on 
the high seas.212 The urgency of the action showed that an interna­
tional agreement was badly needed. The agreement would have to 
go further than UNCLOS III and expand on international regula­
tions for the highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, but also 
provide for a strong regime of enforcement. 
One critical element of the conference was the attendance of a 
large number of non-governmental organizations ("NGOS").213 
The NGOs played a substantial part in maintaining the momentum 
of the conference and ensuring that states reached solid, meaningful 
agreements regarding the fish stocks on the high seas.214 In particu­
lar, the NGOs were armed with several concepts from the Earth 
Summit that they used in order to shape the outcome of the agree­
ment. One of these principles was that of the "precautionary prin­
ciple," which provided that "where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective' measures to prevent envi­
ronmental degradation. "215 
The positions of the various fishing nations diverged at the 
conference. Many of the DWFNs and NGOs argued that the con­
ference should consider conservation and management measures 
for the fish stock as a biological unit over its entire range of distri­
bution instead of along political boundaries.216 A debate ensued 
regarding whether management and conservation measures should 
be compatible throughout all EEZs and with the measures taken on 
the high seas.217 Generally, the coastal states did not want to adopt 
211. See Background Paper Prepared by Secretariat, at 27, U.N. Doc. Ai 
CONF.I64IINF/5 (1993). 
212. See Rieser, supra note 204, at 267; see also Miles & Burke, supra note 93, at 
344-45. See supra notes 103-104 and accomp~nying text for a discussion of Canada's 
action. 
213. See Reiser, supra note 204, at 267. 
214. See A. Charlotte de Fontaubert, The Politics of Negotiation at the United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 29 
OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 79, 83 (1996). 
215. Rieser, supra note 204, at 267. 
216. See Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326. 
217. See id. . 
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such a measure requiring conservation management for fear that it 
would compromise their sovereignty over the living resources 
within the EEZs as provided for in UNCLOS IIF18 
Another hotly debated issue at the conference concerned the 
nature of the flag states' responsibilities regarding their vessels on 
the high seas as well as the responsibilities regarding vessels belong­
ing to other member and non-member states.219 Under UNCLOS 
III, the inability of member states to enforce measures on the high 
seas undermined the general purpose and enforcement ability of 
the treaty as a whole.220 Many states felt that they should have the 
authority to enforce the provisions of the agreement against foreign 
vessels violating the treaty on the high seas and not have the ship be 
subject to sanctions, if any, solely by the flag state. 
The last major debate at the conference was over the meaning 
of the "precautionary principle" and how it would apply to an inter­
national fisheries agreement concerning highly migratory fish and 
straddling stockS.221 The debate centered around what it meant to 
use a precautionary approach toward management of these species. 
The precautionary principle is a hotly debated issue in many 
legal realms, especially those regarding the environment, because 
the principle requires that action be taken even when the evidence 
to support such action is scientifically uncertain.222 The precaution­
ary principle is especially valuable where science may not be able to 
show beyond all doubt that environmental degradation will result if 
actions are not taken.223 
A. Fishery Management Under the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement 
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks adopted a Fish Stocks Agreement on 
August 4, 1995, in New York.224 The Fish Stocks Agreement is re­
quired to have 30 ratifications or accessions in order to come into 
force.225 As of May 1, 1998, the treaty had 59 signatories and only 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of 
enforcement measures. 
221. See Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326. See supra notes 79-81 and accompany­
ing text for definitions of straddling stocks and highly migratory species. 
222. See BERRILL, supra note 28, at 54-55. 
223. See id. 
224. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12. 
225. See id. art. 40, 34 LL.M. at 1572. 
36 
I 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:5 
18 parties.226 The Fish Stocks Agreement applies to the conserva­
tion of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks both within the 
jurisdiction of the member states and on the high seas.227 However, 
the Fish Stocks Agreement also provides that the rights, jurisdic­
tion, and duties of states will not be affected by the Agreement.228 
Coastal states and states fishing on the high seas are required 
to adopt measures that will ensure the long-term sustain ability of 
the straddling and highly migratory fish stock and promote the ob­
jective of optimum utilization of these fisheries.229 In developing 
these measures, the state must ensure not only that the measures 
are based on the best scientific data available, but also that they are 
based on the precautionary approach to management.230 This re­
quires that the state not use the absence of adequate scientific in­
formation as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation 
and management measures.231 The precautionary approach also re­
quires that states take into account uncertainties regarding size and 
productivity of the stocks, which is especially important when deal­
ing with highly migratory fish species.232 Due to the nature of 
highly migratory species, it is very difficult to gather accurate num­
bers as to the average size of the fish and how many of the stock 
remain because one school of swordfish, for example, can travel 
over thousands of miles in its migration patterns. Thus, at any 
given time, a state may have a slightly lower, or higher, count of 
highly migratory species within its jurisdiction. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement takes a step in the direction of pro­
viding protection to stocks as biological units over their entire range 
of distribution. States have a duty to cooperate in achieving com­
226. The parties to the convention and corresponding dates of ratification or ac­
cession are as follows: Bahamas (Jan. 16, 1997); Fiji (Dec. 12, 1996); Iceland (Feb. 14, 
1997); Iran (Apr. 17, 1998); Italy (Mar. 4, 1999); Maldives (Dec. 30, 1998); Mauritius 
(Mar. 25, 1997); Micronesia (May 23, 1997); Namibia (Apr. 8, 1998); Nauru (Jan. 10, 
1997); Norway (Dec. 30, 1996); Russian Federation (Aug. 4, 1997); Saint Lucia (Aug. 9, 
1996); Samoa (Oct. 25, 1996); Senegal (Jan. 30, 1997); Seychelles (Mar. 20, 1998); Solo­
mon Islands (Feb. 13, 1997); Sri Lanka (Oct. 24, 1996); Tonga (Jul. 31, 1996); and the 
United States (Aug. 21, 1996). See Status of the Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Mi­
gratory Fish Stocks (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.un.orglDepts!los!losl64st.htm>. 
227. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1549. 
228. See id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 1549. 
229. See id. art. 5(a), 34 I.L.M. at 1550. 
230. See id. arts. 5(b)-(c), 6(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1550-51. 
231. See id. arts. 5(b)-(c), 6(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1550-51. 
232. See id. art. 6(3)(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1551. 
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patible measures for protection of the stocks and, in doing so, must 
consider: (1) the conservation measures of other states; (2) the 
measures agreed upon for the high seas; (3) those measures 
adopted by regional fishery organizations, including those previ­
ously adopted; (4) the biological unity and characteristics of various 
stocks; and (5) the dependence of various states on the fishery. 
Further, states must ensure that such measures do not result in a 
harmful impact on any living marine resources.233 
Due to the lack of guidelines for the operation and manage­
ment of regional fishery organizations under UNCLOS III, the 
states recognized that there was a need to establish recommenda­
tions for the rearrangement-of pre-existing organizations, as well as 
a need to establish general and specific standards for the develop­
ment of new organizations.234 Although the regulations of the Fish 
Stocks Agreement are international in scope, the majority of its 
provisions will be implemented through regional fishery 
organizations.235 
Like UNCLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires states 
to pursue the conservation and management of highly migratory 
fish stocks, with other states, either directly or through appropriate 
sub-regional or regional organizations.236 However, unlike UN­
CLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement strengthens the duty of states 
to cooperate under these regional organizations and clearly estab­
lishes that a state may be barred from fishing in certain areas if it 
refuses to do SO.237 The Fish Stocks Agreement also allows state 
parties who are members of a regional fisheries organization, or 
participants in a similar organization, to take action "in accordance 
with international law," including through recourse to regional pro­
cedures established for this purpose, to deter vessels that have en­
gaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of the regional 
agreement from fishing on the high seas in that region until the 
appropriate action is taken by the flag state.238 . This provides a 
strong incentive for states to be involved in negotiations with other 
states in the region or with states with which they share a fishery 
resource. 
When creating a regional or sub-regional organization, or 
233. See id. art. 7(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1552. 
234. See Mack, supra note 37, at 325-26. 
235. See id. at 326. 
236. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54. 
237. See id. art. 8(1), (4), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54. 
238. See id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562. 
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when negotiating an agreement through such an organization, the 
Fish Stocks Agreement provides that the states must consider sev­
eral things. The states must agree on what stocks the conservation 
agreement shall apply to while taking into account the biological 
characteristics of those stocks and the nature of the fisheries in­
volved in the harvesting of the stocks.239 In deciding on the area in 
which the agreement will apply, the states must take into considera­
tion the socio-economic, geographical, and environmental charac­
teristics of that area.240 Ensuring that states take these 
characteristics into consideration is especially crucial when striving 
for agreements that are specific to the fishery in that region, as well 
as to the specific habitat and unique features that the area may 
have. For example, considering the above-listed characteristics 
would be crucial when deciding a management and conservation 
regime for fisheries that occur in spawning or feeding grounds of a 
particular species. 
The states must also establish the manner in which the new 
agreement will affect or interact with the objectives, operations, or 
general role of a previous fishery management organization or 
agreement.241 This analysis will ensure that the existing ability of 
any fishery management organizations or agreements will not be 
undermined, but instead will be enhanced and strengthened by ad­
ditional agreements arranged under this treaty.242 
Finally, during the agreement process, the states must establish 
the mechanisms that will be used to obtain scientific review of the 
stocks and to determine whether an advisory body is needed for 
this purpose.243 These are more than just recommendations. The 
member states are required to reach an agreement on all of the 
above factors while in the process of negotiating the conservation 
and management measures that are to be taken.244 By requiring 
these considerations, the agreements that are established between 
states will be stronger and more comprehensive, initially, than those 
required under UNCLOS 111.245 
Since the guidelines are to be agreed upon during the forma­
239. See id. art. 9(1)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 1555. 
240. See id. art. 9(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1555. 
241. See id. art. 9(1)(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1555. 
242. In this regard, the Fish Stocks Agreement differs from UNCLOS III. For a 
discussion of the problems created by UNCLOS III, see supra Part II.A.2. 
243. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9(1)(d), 34 I.L.M. at 1555. 
244. See id. art. 9, 34 I.L.M. at 1554-55. 
245. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the weaknesses of UNCLOS III. 
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tion period,246 states are encouraged to join in the negotiation pro­
cess initially or risk being bound by an agreement that is either not 
satisfactory to them or which excludes them from the fishery alto­
gether. Under Article 17 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, a state that 
is not a member of a regional fisheries organization or a participant 
in such organization, and does not otherwise agree to apply the con­
servation and management measures provided by such organiza­
tion, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling 
stocks.247 This provision providing for cooperation by non-member 
states was not available under UNCLOS III, where non-member 
states to the regional agreement were fishing in areas of the high 
seas. Under UNCLOS III, a state was only obligated by treaty obli­
gations, rights, and duties laid out in other provisions of the 
agreement.248 
After initial cooperation, the states are required to continue 
their obligations. The Fish Stocks Agreement provides a list of re­
quirements consisting of those matters the states must agree on in 
order to fulfill their obligations of cooperation.249 These obliga­
tions include the adoption and implementation of any generally rec­
ommended international minimal standards for the responsible 
conduct of fishing operations.25o These international minimum 
standards supply the basis for a conservation and management level 
that can be applied consistently throughout the range of each 
species. 
B. Enforcement Provisions Under the Fish Stocks Agreement 
While the Fish Stocks Agreement will increase the effective­
ness of the regional management organizations, the ultimate suc­
cess of the agreement is dependent on its enforcement provisions. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement addresses many of the problems that 
UNCLOS III had with compliance and enforcement.251 During the 
conferences prior to its adoption, there was an intense debate as to 
what enforcement powers the agreement should provide to the re­
gional organizations.252 Coastal states wanted the regional organi­
246. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9, 34 I.L.M. at 1554-55. 
247. See id. art. 17(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1559. 
248. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290. 
249. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 10, 34 I.L.M. at 1555-56. 
250. See id. art. lO(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1555. 
251. See Mack, supra note 37, at 328. 
252. See id. at 329; see also Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326. 
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zations to have stronger enforcement powers, while the DWFNs 
wanted enforcement left up to the flag state.253 The Fish Stocks 
Agreement ultimately attempted to balance the opposing interests 
while, at the same time, ensuring that regional organizations were 
given more enforcement powers than had been provided under 
UNCLOS IIJ.254 
Like UNCLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires states 
to pursue the conservation and management of highly migratory 
fish stocks, with other states, either directly or through appropriate 
sub-regional or regional organizations.255 However, the Fish Stocks 
Agreement strengthens the duty of states to cooperate under these 
regional organizations and clearly establishes that a state may be 
barred from fishing in certain areas if it refuses to cooperate.256 
Further, as discussed previously, the Fish Stocks Agreement allows 
state parties who are members of a regional fisheries organization 
or participants in such an organization to take action "in accord­
ance with international law,"257 including through recourse to re­
gional procedures established for this purpose, to deter vessels that 
have engaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of the 
regional agreement from fishing on the high seas in that region until 
the flag state takes appropriate action.258 This provision allowing 
members of a regional fishery organization to have enforcement 
against both members and non-members provides a strong incen­
tive for states to be involved in negotiations with other states in the 
region with whom they share a fishery resource. 
Conversely, under UNCLOS III, the inability of member states 
to enforce measures on the high seas undermined the general pur­
pose and enforcement ability of the treaty as a whole.259 States be­
lieve they should have the authority to enforce the provisions of the 
agreement against foreign vessels and foreign nationals violating 
the treaty on the high seas and not have the ship be subject to sanc­
tions, if any, solely by the flag state. 
In addition, member states had difficulty enforcing the provi­
sions of UNCLOS III against non-member states fishing in the ter­
253. See Mack, supra note 37, at 329. 
254. See id. 
255. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54. 
256. See id. art. 8(1), (4), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54. 
257. See id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562. 
258. See id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562. 
259. See supra ·notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of enforce­
ment on the high seas under UNCLOS III. 
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ritory of the regional organization or the high seas.260 Now, the 
territory of the regional organizations may include areas of the high 
seas, not just areas under the jurisdiction of states.261 Therefore, 
the Fish Stocks Agreement provides authority to the member states 
to successfully deter unregulated fishing.262 When a member state 
has reasonable grounds to believe that a vessel belonging to a non­
member state is engaged in the activity of unauthorized fishing, the 
member state is allowed to investigate and possibly even seize the 
vessel if deemed necessary.263 Article 21 of the Fish Stocks Agree­
ment allows for member states to board and inspect, according to 
procedures set by the regional organization, foreign fishing vessels, 
even if they are not members of the regional organization, in order 
to ensure compliance with conservation and management proce­
dures.264 If it is clear after boarding and inspecting the vessel that a 
violation has been committed, the inspecting state may secure evi­
dence and notify the flag state of the violation.265 
If a "serious violation" is found, the inspectors are allowed to 
stay on board the vessel, secure evidence, and, where appropriate, 
bring the vessel to the nearest port.266 A serious violation is de­
scribed as one of the following: (1) fishing without a valid license; 
(2) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related 
data; (3) fishing in a closed area, during closed season or at time 
when quota has already been exceeded; (4) using prohibited fishing 
gear; (5) falsifying or concealing markings; (6) concealing, tamper­
ing with, or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation; or (7) 
other such violations as decided by regionaf agreement.267 Addi­
tionally, the flag state is required to ensure that its vessels are in 
compliance with all regional and sub-regional conservation and 
management measures for highly migratory and straddling fish 
stocks.268 
Although the Fish Stocks Agreement clarifies and strengthens 
the duties of a member state in enforcing management and conser­
vation agreements, the treaty still leaves the primary responsibility 
260. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of enforce­
ment problems under UNCLOS III. 
261. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1549. 
262. See id. art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1549. 
263. See id. art. 21, 34 I.L.M. at 1563-65. 
264. See id. art. 21(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1563. 
265. See id. art. 21(5), 34 I.L.M. at 1563. 
266. See id. art. 21(5), 34 I.L.M. at 1563. 
267. See id. art. 21(11), 34 I.L.M. at 1564-65. 
268. See id. art. 18, 34 I.L.M. at 1559-61. 
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of ensuring vessel compliance with the flag state.269 Leaving the 
primary responsibility of ensuring vessel compliance with the flag 
state was perceived, by the coastal states, to be one of the weak­
nesses of UNCLOS III, although the DWFNs preferred this method 
of regulation.270 To balance these interests, the Fish Stocks Agree­
ment strengthened and clarified the duties of the flag state. For 
example, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires that flag states en­
force conservation measures regardless of where the violations oc­
CUr.271 Additionally, flag states now have a duty to ensure 
immediate investigation of any violation and to report the findings 
of that investigation to the appropriate regional organization having 
authority over the area in which the violation occurred.272 Further, 
if a violation is found, the flag state is required to prohibit the vessel 
from fishing on the high seas until sanctions can be decided by the 
flag state.273 Moreover, flag states still retain the ability to impose 
their own sanctions in accordance with the laws of their state upon 
the vessel in violation.274 Thus, while member states have more au­
thority to enforce the provisions of the regional management orga­
nizations, the flag states still have the primary authority in the 
investigation and sanctioning process.275 Therefore, there is always 
a risk that investigations will not be thorough and sanctions will not 
be strong enough.276 
The Fish Stocks Agreement has, nonetheless, provided 
stronger enforcement measures against other member states in vio­
lation of regional management agreements. When a member state 
alleges that another member has committed a violation, the flag 
state has the obligation to investigate the allegation.277 More im­
portantly, states may board and investigate the vessel, its license, 
gear, records, and any fish or fishery products it may have on 
board.278 The member state may actually suspend the foreign ves­
sel's authorization to fish and demand that it return to port if the 
foreign vessel refuses to allow boarding for inspection.279 Regional 
269. See id. art. 18, 34 I.L.M. at 1559-61. 
270. See Mack, supra note 37, at 322. 
271. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 19(1)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 156l. 
272. See id. art. 19(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1561. 
273. See id. art. 19(1)(e), 34 I.L.M. at 156l. 
274. See id. art. 21(13), 34 I.L.M. at 1565. 
275. See Mack, supra note 37, at 33l. 
276. See id. 
277. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 19(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1561. 
278. See id. art. 22(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1566. 
279. See id. art. 22(4),34 I.L.M. at 1566. 
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organizations may adopt stronger standards than those provided by 
the Fish Stocks Agreement regarding the boarding and inspection 
of vessels in violation; however, they may also limit those 
provisions.28o 
Although the Fish Stocks Agreement is not yet in force,281 the 
treaty is clearly a big step in the right direction of conserving highly 
migratory and straddling stocks. The effectiveness of the treaty will 
remain to be seen, but it is clear that it provides a better regulatory 
scheme than that provided under UNCLOS III. The Fish Stocks 
Agreement comes at a time when the highly migratory fish stocks 
are at an all-time dangerous low. Although a step in the right direc­
tion, the Fish Stocks Agreement may be too late to have a substan­
tial impact on the rapidly declining stocks. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Internationally and domestically, the regulation of the conser­
vation and management of North Atlantic swordfish appears to be 
substantial. However, as shown in this analysis of each individual 
regulatory scheme, there are several areas where improvements 
need to be made.282 Successful fishery management requires ade­
quate information, efficient administration, effective enforcement, 
mandatory compliance, regular evaluation, and constant plan devel­
opment.283 The success of each one is dependent on the success of 
the others. 
The North Atlantic swordfish, as a highly migratory species, is 
in need of a conservation regime that encompasses all of the above 
attributes and which would be effective for the entire range of spe­
cies.284 An effective conservation plan requires international coop­
eration of all the states engaged in the fishing of the North Atlantic 
swordfish to implement management and conservation procedures 
that apply not only on the high seas, but also within the EEZs of 
each state. Anything less will result in an uneven conservation 
scheme where the species is less protected in certain parts of its 
280. See id. art. 21(2), (15), 34 I.L.M. at 1563, 1565. 
281. See supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the re­
quirements for the Fish Stocks Agreement to come into force. 
282. See supra Parts II-IV. 
283. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the requirements for successful fish­
ery management. 
284. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for 
a comprehensive regime for swordfish. 
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migratory path than in others.285 As evidenced by present num­
bers, an ineffective conservation program in anyone area can un­
dermine the entire scheme of protection and put the species at risk 
for over-exploitation.286 
UNCLOS III, while the first major international agreement to 
create jurisdictional and regulatory zones for fishery resources, was 
ineffective at covering the conservation of highly migratory spe­
cies.287 Furthermore, UNCLOS III only slightly modified the prin­
ciple of "freedom on the high seas," and has thus been inadequate 
at providing even minimal protection of highly migratory species, 
either within EEZs or on the high seas.288 
Regional organizations established under UNCLOS III have 
generally failed to provide any substantial protection of the spe­
cies.289 The lack of guidelines for the establishment and operation 
of such regional organizations within UNCLOS III had a significant 
influence on this outcome. Many of these organizations concen­
trated on single species management and failed to take into account 
the interdependency of species on other .stocks.290 The predomi­
nant reason for the failure, however, is the lack of guidelines for 
establishing enforcement provisions.291 The objective of the treaty 
to conserve and manage fish stocks is sufficiently undermined by 
non-adherence by member and non-member states and by the 
adoption of unilateral measures by some major fishing countries.292 
In order to re-establish the conservation and management of 
fishery stocks under UNCLOS III, action needs to be taken to reor­
ganize and provide management of all the regional fishery organi­
zations that were established under the treaty.293 Further action 
also needs to be taken to ensure consistency throughout the regions 
285. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the effects of less than comprehen­
sive conservation schemes for highly migratory species. 
286. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the possibility of over-exploitation. 
287. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of how UNCLOS III is ineffective for 
conservation of highly migratory species. 
288. See supra Part II.A.2 for an explanation of the ineffective modifications of 
UNCLOS III. 
289. See supra Part 1I.A.2 for a discussion of how regional organizations estab­
lished under UNCLOS III have failed to protect highly migratory species. 
290. See Iudicello, supra note 63, at 124. 
291. See Mack, supra note 37, at 318. 
292. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of non-adherence and the adoption of 
unilateral measures. 
293. See supra Part I1.A.2 for a discussion of regional fishery organizations under 
UNCLOS III. 
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regarding regulations on the same species.294 These deficiencies in 
UNCLOS III are addressed adequately in the recent Fish Stocks 
Agreement, which seeks to reaffirm the regulatory procedures 
needed to protect the highly migratory species.295 
The 1966 International Convention for the Conservation of At­
lantic Tunas is also insufficient to deal adequately with the manage­
ment of the swordfish.296 Any recommendation proposed to 
ICCAT, an organization formed under the Convention, regarding 
the management and conservation of species may be objected to by 
one or more of the parties, and thus become inapplicable to that 
party or to all parties, depending upon the number of parties ob­
jecting.297 ICCAT does not even possess regulatory power; rather, 
the organization depends on the willingness of the states to imple­
ment its recommendations.298 
ICCAT recommendations on quotas should be able to be re­
duced if the United States wants to implement lower quotas. Pres­
ently, however, the Atlantic Thnas Convention Act and the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
prevent this action in their language.299 Still, other actions are 
available to the United States, which are consistent with ICCAT 
recommendations. For example, time and area closures can be im­
plemented to protect key nursery areas and spawning grounds of 
swordfish. One such action under consideration has been closing 
nursery grounds to fishing within the United States' jurisdictional 
zone at times of the year when juvenile fish congregate.300 Such a 
closing of the nursery grounds would help to protect juvenile 
swordfish, which are vital to the future of the swordfish stocks in 
the North Atlantic. 
A principal criticism of both the international and domestic 
management regime is that both rely primarily upon a minimum 
size limit rather than implementing "variable season closures," as 
recommended by fishery management cQuncils, or "time and area 
294. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the current inconsistencies between 
regions. 
295. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
296. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the inadequacies of ICCAT in dealing 
with swordfish. 
297. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for provisions regarding objec­
tion under ICCAT. 
298. See supra note 123-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of 
regulatory control under ICCAT. 
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300. See id. 
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closures" as authorized by the 1990 recommendations made by IC­
CAT.30l The 1990 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act pro­
vided for the management of highly migratory fish species under 
the conservation requirements of the Act; however, the ambiguity 
regarding the relationship between ATCA and the Magnuson-Ste­
vens Act continues to provide a means for opting to regulate under 
the least restrictive means available.302 
In addition, the minimum size of catchable swordfish should be 
increased to a weight which is closer to those corresponding with 
mature females in the stock.303 The minimum weight, as it stands 
now, is significantly below the reproductive size of the female 
swordfish.304 As such, the future viability of the stock is at stake 
because the population cannot reproduce fast enough to keep 
ahead of its exploitation.305 Increasing the minimum size and 
weight requirements would also help to discourage fishing in areas 
where juvenile swordfish are prevalent.306 
The United States should concentrate more of its efforts to 
conserve and manage highly migratory species on an international, 
rather than a domestic, level.307 Concentrating more efforts on an 
international level would require the United States to be a more 
active member in ICCAT.308 As such, the United States could be­
come a leader in the implementation of tougher regulations which 
would encourage other states to follow. Additionally, the United 
States should encourage ICCAT nations to adopt the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement,· which implements the precautionary approach 
to fishery management.309 Moreover, the United States should en­
courage ICCAT to adopt the Fish Stocks Agreement's conservation 
requirements regarding highly migratory and straddling fish 
301. See id. at 79. 
302. See id. 
303. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on the maturity of the female sword­
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305. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the declin­
ing numbers of swordfish stocks. 
306. See supra Part I for a general discussion on the status of swordfish stocks. 
307. See supra Part II for discussion of international regulation of swordfish. 
308. See supra Part II.B for a discussion on ICCAT. 
309. See supra Part IV for a discussion on the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. In 
addition, see supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text regarding the precautionary 
principle of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
47 1999] HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH SPECIES 
stocks.310 
Domestic regulation of the highly migratory species is impor­
tant. However, domestic regulation focuses on the species only 
when it is within United States' jurisdiction and, as such, is not ef­
fectively managing and conserving the species for the long term.311 
Therefore, on the domestic level, the Magnuson-Stevens Act should 
be amended to create stricter guidelines for the management and 
operation of the regional fishery management councils established 
under its provisions.312 Additionally, the control of FMPs should 
be returned to the regional councils from the Secretary of Com­
merce.313 With the return of power to the regional councils, regula­
tions would be needed to set forth strict requirements for the 
councils to follow so that the conservation and management of 
these fish stocks will be constantly updated and will adequately re­
flect the urgency of the current situation.314 
CONCLUSION 
Highly migratory fish stocks in the North Atlantic are in great 
peril. Overfishing has depleted the stocks and allowed for greater 
numbers of juvenile fish to be harvested. The goal of long term 
conservation of species, such as the North Atlantic swordfish, re­
quires that stringent international and domestic regulations be 
adopted and followed. All states that have a stake in these fisheries 
should adopt the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement in order to further 
this goal. The Fish Stocks Agreement is, however, only a step in the 
process of complete fishery management of those species. The 
swordfish stocks are dwindling dramatically with every harvesting 
season that passes. The time for action is now, before it is too late. 
310. See supra Part ILB for a discussion of ICCAT, and supra Part IV for discus­
sion of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. 
311. See supra Part III for discussion of domestic regulation under ATCA and 
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313. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the au­
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